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Abstract
Non Interference   has been proposed for modelling and analysing information
ow in systems In   we have indeed shown that the Non Interference property
called NDC can be applied also in the area of network security for the analysis
of typical cryptographic protocol properties eg authentication non	repudiation

In this paper we extend the results of   by showing that NDC can be also easily
adapted to detect secrecy attacks over networks
  Introduction
Secrecy is one of the main issues in security  In general a system or a
protocol preserves the secrecy of a set of data if it guarantees that non 
authorized usersentities never gain access to such data 
In  a non interference property called Non Deducibility on Composi 
tions NDC has been proposed for the detection of information 	ows inside
systems  It is a strong property which guarantees that no information 	ow is
possible from a set of high level users representing the authorized users to
the set of low level ones who are not authorized to access secret data 
 
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In this paper we show how NDC can be easily adapted for analysing secrecy
in networks  Indeed the main aim of our current research is to 
nd a uniform
approach for de
ning the many variants of security properties in such a way
that they can be all seen as speci
c instances of a general NDCbased scheme
called GNDC   This is badly needed in order to compare classify and
evaluate the merits of the various de
nitions and possibly to provide general
eective proof techniques that can be applied suitably for all properties 
To this aim in  we have presented a process algebra called CryptoSPA
in turn an improvement of SPA  which borrows some concepts from the
language de
ned in  that is expressive enough to model a large class of
systems e g  non mobile security protocols  CryptoSPA has been chosen as
the common model for comparing the various properties through the general
unifying scheme  The idea behind is essentially non interference proposed
many years ago  in a completely dierent context to study information 	ow
in computer systems and widely studied in   Roughly a system is
secure if its behaviour cannot be signi
cantly altered hence no interference
is possible when executed in a hostile environment  This property is a direct
generalization of NDC  
Some security properties e g  authentication as in  and denial of
service as in  have been shown as instances of our general scheme in  
The main goal of this paper is to show that also secrecy can be easily de
ned in
our NDCbased framework  This is interesting as it strengthens our claim that
non interference plays an important role in the speci
cation and analysis of
security protocols  Indeed non interference seems the strongest property that
can be de
ned for cryptographic protocols see also   Moreover it shows
that non interference originally proposed for detecting information 	ows in
systems is also pro
table for revealing secrecy attacks in network security 
The paper is organized as follows in Section  we de
ne the model in
Section  we de
ne secrecy as a NDCbased property Section  reports a
simple example 
nally Section  is about future work 
 The Model
In this section we report from  the language we use for the speci
cation
of authentication properties and protocols  It is called Cryptographic Secu 
rity Process Algebra CryptoSPA for short and it is basically a variant of
valuepassing CCS  where the processes are provided with some primitives
for manipulating messages  In particular processes can perform message en
cryption and decryption and also construct complex messages by composing
together simpler ones 
 The CryptoSPA Syntax
CryptoSPA syntax is based on the following elements

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 
A set I  fa  b    g of input channels a set O  fa 

b    g of output ones
 
A set M of basic messages and a set K of encryption keys with a function
 
 
 K  K such that k
 

 
 k  The set M of all messages is de
ned
as the least set such that M K  M and m  M k  K we have that
m m

 and fmg
k
also belong to M
 
A family U of sets of messages and a function Msgc  I O  U which
maps every channel c into the set of possible messages that can be sent and
received on such channel  Msg is such that Msgc  Msgc 
 
A set C of public channels these channels represent the insecure network
where the enemy can intercept and fake messages
 
A set Act  fcm j c  I m Msgcgfcm j c  O m Msgcgfg
of actions  is the internal invisible action ranged over by a we also
have a function chana which returns c if a is either cm or cm and the
special channel void when a    we assume that void is never used within
a restriction operator see below 
 
A set Const of constants ranged over by A 
The syntax of CryptoSPA agents is de
ned as follows
E   cxE c eE E E  E E kE E n L
Am
 
      m
n
 e  e

EE he
 
   e
r
i 
rule
xEE
where x is a variable m
 
      m
n
are messages e  e
 
       e
r
are messages pos
sibly containing variables and L is a set of input channels  Both the operators
cxE and he
 
   e
r
i 
rule
xEE

bind the variable x in E  It is also nec
essary to de
ne constants as follows Ax
 
       x
n

def
 E where E is a Cryp
toSPA agent which may contain no free variables except x
 
       x
n
 which
must be distinct 
We basically have all the standard operators of valuepassing CCS  In
particular the synchronization between parallel processes allows to exchange
a value through the following simple mechanism a system cxE
 
k cmE

can execute an internal  action moving to E
 
mx kE

 where E
 
mx is the
process E
 
with all the occurrences of x replaced by m  Thus process cxE
 

is indeed receiving in variable x the value m sent out by process cmE

 
Besides the standard valuepassing CCS operators we have an additional
one that has been introduced in order to model message handling and cryp
tography  Informally the hm
 
  m
r
i 
rule
xE
 
E

process tries to deduce
an information z from the tuple of messages hm
 
  m
r
i through one ap
plication of rule 
rule
 if it succeeds then it behaves like E
 
zx otherwise
it behaves like E

 for example given a rule 
dec
for decryption process
hfmg
k
  k
 
i 
dec
xE
 
E

decrypts message fmg
k
through key k
 
and be
haves like E
 
mx while hfmg
k
  k

i 
dec
xE
 
E

with k

 k
 
 tries to
decrypt the same message with the wrong inverse key k

and since it is not
permitted by 
dec
 it behaves like E

 

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Fig  Message manipulation where m m

 M and k  k
 
 K
We call E the set of all the CryptoSPA terms and we de
ne sortE to be
the set of all the channels syntactically occurring in the term E 
 The Operational Semantics of CryptoSPA
The semantics of CryptoSPA is given through labelled transition systems  A
labelled transition system lts is essentially an automaton with possibly in

nitely many states  It is de
ned as a triple S  T  such that S is a set of
states T is a set of labels actions and   S 	 T 	 S is a set of labelled
transitions  S
 
    S

  or equivalently S
 
 
 S

 means that the system
can move from the state S
 
to the state S

through the action  
In order to modelmessage handling and cryptography in Figure  we de
ne
an inference system which formalizes the way messages may be manipulated
by processes  It is indeed quite similar to those used by many authors see
e g    In particular it can combine two messages obtaining a pair rule

pair
 it can extract one message from a pair rules 
fst
and 
snd
 it can
encrypt a message m with a key k obtaining fmg
k
and 
nally decrypt a
message of the form fmg
k
only if it has the corresponding inverse key k
 
rules 
enc
and 
dec
  We denote with D the set of messages that can be
deduced by applying the inference rules on the messages in   Note that we
are assuming encryption as completely reliable  Indeed we do not allow any
kind of cryptographic attack e g  the guessing of secret keys  This permits to
observe the attacks that can be carried out even if cryptography is completely
reliable 
The formal behaviour of a CryptoSPA term is described by means of the lts
 E  Act  f
a
g
aAct
 where
a
 is the least relation between CryptoSPA
terms induced by axioms and inference rules of Figure  where symmetric
rules for 
 
 k
 
and k

are omitted for the sake of readability  The operational
semantics for a term E is the subpart of the CryptoSPA lts reachable from
the initial state E 
Example   We present a very simple example of a protocol where A sends
a message m
A
to B encrypted with a key k
AB
shared between A and B 


For the sake of readability we omit the termination  at the end of every agent speci
cations eg we write a in place of a  We also write m  m
 
E in place of m  m
 
E 
and analogously for hm
 
     m
r
i  
rule
xE 

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Fig  Operational semantics symmetric rules omitted
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Am k
def
 hm ki 
enc
xc x
Bk
def
 cyhy  ki 
dec
zout z
P
def
 Am
A
  k
AB
 kBk
AB

where k
 
AB
 k
AB
 that models a symmetric encryption and Msgc 
ffmg
k
j m  M k  Kg that declares the type of messages sent over c 
We want to analyze the execution of P with no intrusions we thus consider
P n fcg since the restriction guarantees that c is a completely secure channel 
We obtain a system which can only execute action outm
A
that represents
the correct transmission of m
A
from A to B  In particular we have that
Am
A
  k
AB

c fm
A
g
k
AB
  and Bk
AB
 can synchronize on that action by execut
ing a Bk
AB

cfm
A
g
k
AB

 hfm
A
g
k
AB
  k
AB
i 
dec
zout z  So
P n fcg

  k hfm
A
g
k
AB
  k
AB
i 
dec
zout z n fcg
outm
A
  k  n fcg
In the next section we analyze the execution of this simple protocol in a hostile
environment 
 Hostile Environments
In this section we report the characterization of hostile environments as given
in   Such a characterization is necessary to analyze protocols where some
information is assumed to be secret as it always happens in cryptographic
protocols  Basically a hostile environment is an agent which tries to attack
a protocol by stealing and faking the information which is transmitted on the
CryptoSPA public channels in set C  In principle such an agent could be mod
eled as a generic process X which can communicate only through the channels
belonging to C i e  X  E
C
where E
C
def
 fE  E j sortE  Cg  However

Focardi  Gorrieri and Martinelli
in this way we obtain that X is a completely powerful attacker which is able
to guess every secret information e g  cryptographic keys nonces private
messages and is thus not suitable when analyzing cryptographic protocols 
We show this crucial point through a simple example 
Example    Consider again the protocol P of Example    Since only A
and B know k
AB
 this protocol should guarantee the secrecy of m
A
even in
the presence of a hostile environment  We assume that c  pub  C are public
channels and we consider the following process
Xk
def
 cxhx  ki 
dec
m pub y
It intercepts a message sent over channel c and tries to decrypt it using key k 
If it succeeds then it makes the message public by sending it as plaintext over
channel pub  Note that Xk belongs to E
C
since sortXm k  fc  pubg 
Consider now Xk
AB
 and the following protocol under attack note that
we put X inside the scope of restriction
P kXk
AB
 n C
After one  step Xk
AB
 will be able to execute pubm
A
 representing the fact
that m
A
is not secret anymore 

This happens since Xk
AB
 is able to guess
k
AB
 but we would like to forbid such behaviour since as mentioned above
we are interested in attacks that can be carried out even when cryptography
is completely reliable 
This problem can be solved by imposing some constraints on the initial
data that are known by the intruders  Given a process E we call IDE the
set of messages that syntactically appear in E  Intuitively this set contains
all the messages that are initially known by E  Now let 
I
 M be the
initial knowledge that we would like to give to the intruder X i e  the public
information such as the names of the entities and the public keys plus some
possible private data of the intruder e g  its private key or nonces  For a
certain intruder X we want that all the messages in IDX are deducible
from 
I
 
The set E

I
C
of processes which can communicate on a subset of C and have
an initial knowledge bound by 
I
can be thus de
ned as follows
E

I
C
 fX j X  E
C
and IDX  D
I
g
We consider as hostile processes only those belonging to this particular set  In
the example above if we require that k
AB
is not deducible from 
I
i e  it is
not public we can easily see that the behavior of Xk
AB
 cannot be simulated
by any process in E

I
C
 

Indeed such an event is not directly observable since pub  C In Section  we will show
how to solve this

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 Trace Equivalence
Most of the security properties that have been proposed for the analysis of
security protocols are based on the simple notion of trace two processes are
equivalent if they exactly show the same execution sequences called traces 
In order to formally de
ne it we need a transition relation which does not
consider internal  moves 
Denition   The expression E
 

 E

is a shorthand for E



E
 
 

E





E

 where 



denotes a possibly empty sequence of  labelled
transitions  Let   
 
   
n
 Actnfg

be a trace then E


 E

if there
exist E
 
  E

       E
n 
 E such that E
 
 

 E
 
 


      
 
n  

 E
n 
 
n

 E

 
We thus de
ne trace preorder 
trace
 and trace equivalence 
trace

Denition   For any E  E the set T E of traces associated with E is
T E  f  Act n fg

j E

 E


 E

g  F can execute all the traces
of E notation E 
trace
F  i T E  T F   E and F are trace equivalent
notation E 
trace
F  i E 
trace
F and F 
trace
E i e  i T E  T F  
 Secrecy in Protocols through Non Interference
In this section we show that NDC can be easily adapted for analysing secrecy
in networks  NDC is de
ned as follows
Denition  A process S is NDC i
X  E

I
C
S kX n C 
trace
S n C
In other words S is NDC if every possible enemy X which has an initial
knowledge limited by 
I
is not able to signi
cantly change the behaviour of
the system  Note that S nC is the system S where the public channels C are
made private i e  where no enemy can intercept or introduce fake messages 
Consider now a protocol P M and assume that we want to verify if P M
preserves the secrecy of message M   This can be done by proving that every
enemy which does not know message M  cannot learn it by interacting with
P M  Thus we need a mechanism that noti
es whenever an enemy is learn
ing M   We implement it through a simple process called knowledge notier
which reads from a public channel c
k
 C n sortP M not used in P M
and executes a learntM action if the read value is exactly equal to M   For a
generic message m it can be de
ned as follows
KNm
def
 c
k
ym  ylearntm
We assume that learnt is a special channel that is never used by protocols
and is not public i e  learnt  sortP   C  We now consider P

m
def

P m kKNm i e  a modi
ed protocol where the learning of M is now
noti
ed  A very intuitive de
nition of secrecy can be thus given as follows
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Denition   P m preserves the secrecy of m i for all secret messages
M  M n D
I
 and for all enemies X  E

I
C
there exist no trace 	
 
   	
n
such that 	
 
   	
n
learntM  T P

M kX n C 
In other words we require that for every secretM and for every enemyX
process P

M kX n C never executes an learntM action 
This de
nition models very well the notion of secrecy  On the one hand
if P

M kX n C executes learntM then M has been sent over the public
channel c
k
by either P M or X  In both cases the message is not secret
anymore  In the former situation P M is making M public while in the
latter X has for sure learned M before sending it over c
k
  On the other hand
if an enemy X is able to learn message M then there also exists an enemy X

that will send such a message over channel c
k
and thus P

M kX n C will
eventually execute learntM  
We want now to use NDC to perform this check  Note that NDC already
contains the quanti
cation over all the possible enemies  The following holds
Proposition  Consider a protocol P m such that sortP m  Cnfc
k
g
Then P m preserves the secrecy of m in the sense of Denition  i
M  M nD
I
 P

M is NDC
Proof  
 Note that P

M nC 
trace
 since sortP m  C n fc
k
g  As a
matter of fact learntM is the only action that P

MnC could execute it is
the only one which is not captured by the restriction over C but P M cannot
send messages over c
k
and learnt  Moreover we have that sortX  C thus
the only action that is executable by P

M kXnC is again learntM   Now
if by De
nition   P

M kXnC never executes an learntM action then
we obtain P

M kX n C 
trace
 
trace
P

M nC for every X i e  P

M
is NDC 
 If P

M is NDC then for all enemies X we have P

M kX n C 
trace
P

MnC 
trace
  This of course means that P

M kXnC cannot execute
learntM and holds for every possible M  
Intuitively this result means that NDC corresponds to secrecy when i
the only action we observe is exactly learntM and ii channel c
k
is a special
one that cannot be used in P m 
These requirements are both captured by the condition sortP m 
C n fc
k
g i e  the speci
cation P m can use neither c
k
nor channels that are
not public thus not restricted in the composition with the enemy  Usually
these particular channels are called observable e g  learnt is an observable
channel  Note that such a condition is not restrictive as it only requires a
particular form of the speci
cation  Moreover it is consistent with the idea of
NDCbased veri
cations see e g   we 
x the property NDC and we
capture dierent properties by just de
ning dierent observable actions 

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 An Example
In this section we show through a simple example how the NDCbased secrecy
veri
cation works  We consider a simpli
ed version of the Wide Mouthed Frog
Protocol  
Consider two processes A and B respectively sharing keys k
AS
and k
BS
with a trusted server S  In order to establish a secure channel with B A
sends a fresh key k
AB
encrypted with k
AS
to the server S  Then the server
decrypts the key and forwards it to B this time encrypted with k
BS
  Now B
has the key k
AB
and A can send a message m
A
encrypted with k
AB
to B  The
protocol is composed of the following three messages
Message  A  S  A B  fk
AB
g
k
AS
Message  S  B  fA  k
AB
g
k
BS
Message  A  B  fm
A
g
k
AB
The main dierences with respect to the original protocol is that here messages
 and  do not contain timestamps as studied in  for authentication 
Moreover in message  the identi
erB is sent as plaintext while in the original
protocol it is encrypted with the session key this modi
cation generates as
we will show a secrecy attack  We specify the protocol as follows

Am k
def
 c
 
A B  fkg
k
AS
  c

fmg
k
B
def
 c

y  hy  k
BS
i 
dec
z z 
snd
s c

t  ht  si 
dec
w
S
def
 c
 
x  x 
fst
i i 
fst
s i 
snd
r
x 
snd
c hc Ksi 
dec
z c

fs  zg
Kr
 S
P n
def
 An  k
AB
 kB kS
where Kid is a function that returns the key shared between the server and
entity id e g  KA returns k
AS
  Moreover we have that fc
 
  c

  c

g  C 
Since P n only uses channels c
 
  c

  c

we have that sortP n  C n
fc
k
g  The condition of Proposition   is then satis
ed and we can prove
through NDC that P m does not preserve the secrecy ofm ifA E K
ES
 
I
 
Consider the following enemy

X
def
 c
 
x x 
snd
y   intercepts message 
c
 
A E  y   replaces B with E sends it
c

z hz  k
ES
i 
dec
w w 
snd
k   intercepts msg  obtains k
c

jhj  ki 
dec
m   decrypts msg 
c
k
m   sends message to KN

We encode tuples through a left associative canonical form eg the rst message
AB fk
AB
g
k
AS
becomes 

AB fk
AB
g
k
AS


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It is easy to see that process P

M k

X n C 
trace
P

M nC as the former
process can execute learntM   The attack performed by

X is the following
Message  A  ES  A B  fK
AB
g
K
AS
Message 

EA  S  A E  fK
AB
g
K
AS
Message 

S  E  fA K
AB
g
K
ES
Message  A  EB  fMg
K
AB
By message 

the enemy learns K
AB
and by message  which is addressed to
B it 
nally learns M  
Consider now the protocol where in the 
rst message B is encrypted with
the session key
Message  A  S  A  fB K
AB
g
K
AS
Here the secrecy attack is not possible anymore  We can prove this automat
ically through the CoSeCCVS tools  as discussed in the next section 
 Future Work
In order to compare various formalizations of security properties we have
de
ned in  a general scheme that permits to capture a number of properties
e g  authentication as in  and denial of service as in  as particular
instances of the scheme itself  The results presented in this paper have allowed
us to extend the set of properties de
ned in the scheme  Our main issue is
now to 
nd comparison results in order to obtain a complete classi
cations
in the style of  which could help in evaluating the relative merits of all
such properties 
Another aim of our current research is to provide general eective proof
techniques that can be suitably applied to a set of security properties  Indeed
the de
nition of security properties as instances of the GNDC scheme 
allows us to use a uniform analysis technique in order to check all of them 
For example in  we show how NDC can be used to check authentication
properties  Moreover in this paper we have seen that secrecy can be easily
de
ned as NDC  This permits the reuse of automatic checking techniques for
NDC in order to check secrecy over CryptoSPA protocols indeed if 
I
is

nite then it is possible to 
nd a mostgeneral intruder Top such that NDC
is reduced to just one check P

M k Top n C 
trace
P

M n C see  for
more details that can be veri
ed using the tool in  
This kind of veri
cation can be in principle applied to all the properties
we have de
ned in our scheme  Moreover the 	exibility of the GNDCscheme
makes it possible to verify dierent properties in just one NDC check  
An alternative way of analysing security properties with the GNDC scheme
is to apply compositional analysis techniques as done in   These can

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be used even when the mostgeneral intruder approach described above is not
applicable 
An automatic veri
cation can be carried out only if we 
x in advance
the maximum number of instances of A and B as done in the example of
Section   Some recent results see e g   show that the veri
cation of
a 
xed number of sessions of a protocol can be in some cases sucient to
prove the general correctness of such a protocol  It would be interesting to
have similar results for GNDC since they could be applied to all the properties
de
ned in the scheme 
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